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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to explore the size and normative implications of 
macroeconomic discrepancies between EMU countries. Available data and empirical 
work show that EMU countries display noticeable heterogeneity in terms of economic 
development, exposure to shocks and adjustment mechanisms. But this does not seem to 
prevent a relatively high degree of similarity in their cyclical patterns. And the remaining 
discrepancies do not seem much influenced by monetary and exchange rate policies. 
Indeed, EMU makes a limited difference in terms of the cross-country effects of common 
shocks. It may nevertheless have an influence on the ability of countries to absorb 
idiosyncratic shocks. The problem is therefore not a deficit of homogeneity so much as a 
possible deficit of flexibility for each economy to adjust smoothly to country-specific 
developments. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last few years, the dynamism of economic activity in the euro area economy has been 
relatively scant: average GDP growth between 2001 and 2004 was only 1.3%, half the related 
figure in the United States. This has contributed to increasing the income per-capita gap 
between both areas. However, not all euro zone economies have grown at the same modest 
rates. Indeed, countries like Greece, Spain and, especially, Ireland have significantly 
outperformed the EMU average while others, such as Germany, Italy and Portugal have 
clearly lagged behind. The combination of low average growth and noticeable cross-country 
discrepancies in the performance of the euro area economies have prompted an ongoing 
debate on the possible adverse effect of the single monetary and exchange rate policies on 
economic activity in the euro area. 
By and large this debate is a follow-up of the discussion in the nineties on the 
suitability of the EU as a currency area. Starting with the report One Market, One Money 
[see Emerson et al. (1992)], an extensive literature has assessed the pros and cons of 
the EMU project. Essentially, two issues have merited most attention: first, gains from trade 
creation as a consequence of the elimination of foreign exchange risk and associated 
transaction costs [see e.g. Rose (2000), and Rose and Wincoop (2001)]; and second, losses 
due to a lack of domestic stabilisation tools [see e.g. Eichengreen (1992), and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997)]. 
The short history of EMU has already allowed direct evidence to be had on 
trade integration generated by the single currency. In particular, Micco et al. (2003) and 
Baldwin (2005) confirm that trade effects of the currency are large. The availability of only a 
few years’ data not yet spanning a complete business cycle prevents a thorough assessment 
of the implications of the single monetary and exchange rate policy on the macroeconomic 
stability of the Member States. We do, however, have some data and empirical literature that 
allow some light to be shed on whether national macroeconomic developments are diverging 
excessively for a workable and welfare-improving monetary union. The analysis of this issue 
entails not only measuring the degree of heterogeneity in the performance of EMU Member 
States, but also an attempt to understand its determinants and, in particular, the extent to 
which such heterogeneity has been reduced or exacerbated by the current monetary union 
regime. 
The objective of the paper is precisely to review the available analytical and statistical 
evidence on this issue. Although we will focus mainly on cyclical discrepancies across 
countries, we will start by reviewing in section 2 some basic structural features. Section 3 will 
be devoted to evaluating the degree of similarity of national business cycle fluctuations. 
Section 4 explores differences in the degree of exposure to different types of shocks and in 
the propagation mechanisms. Section 5 focuses on the influence of the monetary union 
regime on the observed discrepancies. Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
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2 Structural features 
In order to highlight some basic structural characteristics of the euro area national economies, 
it is useful to recall first some relatively well-known patterns of growth accounting in the euro 
area as whole, in comparison with the United States as depicted in Table 2.1. Namely: 
i) There is a significant welfare gap (in terms of GDP per-capita) between the United 
States and the eurozone which has increased slightly in the last decade or so. 
ii) The gap is due both to lower productivity and lower use of labour input. The 
relative importance of these two factors depends on whether labour is measured in hours 
or employees. When employment figures are used as is done for simplicity in Table 2.1, the 
productivity differential effect predominates. 
iii) Although the labour utilisation gap has been partially corrected in the last few 
years, the productivity gap has actually increased, due to both the mechanical effect of higher 
employment creation but also to a technological deficit affecting TFP. 
Observing now the cross-country evidence (presented in Chart 2.1 and 2.2), the 
dispersion of GDP per-capita in EMU countries is not small due essentially to the relative 
underperformance of three countries –Greece, Spain and Portugal– despite the real 
convergence process experienced by the first two economies. Luxembourg1 and, more 
recently, Ireland are the countries that most significantly outperform the euro area 
average. This ranking of countries in terms of income per-capita is largely explained by 
relative productivity levels. By contrast, although employment rates and, to a less extent, 
demographic developments also diverge, labour utilisation, seem less heterogeneous than 
productivity across countries. 
In any case the above evidence shows that GDP per-capita is lower than in the 
United States in all countries, except Luxembourg; that with no exception, EMU countries 
are less productive than the United States; and that labour utilisation is similar or smaller than 
in the United States in nearly all the EMU Member States. Therefore, although there are 
relevant structural differences across countries, the usual general qualitative statements on 
the main basic structural characteristic of the euro-area economy can safely be applied to 
most EMU Member States. 
                                                                          
1. Due to statistical difficulties, employment and GDP in Luxemburg is not properly corrected from non resident workers. 
It overstates the Luxemburg per-capita income and employment rate. 
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3 Cyclical divergences 
An important aspect in assessing the degree of homogeneity among Member State 
economies is the comparative analysis of the business cycle. This concept refers to 
the regular, sequential pattern of broad movements of a stationary nature in economic 
variables around their long-term trend. In principle, synchronism in the cycles of the euro 
area countries can be considered a positive factor in monetary union because it facilitates the 
co-ordination of economic policies and, in particular, the conduct of a common monetary 
policy. 
This section thus examines the degree of homogeneity of the Member States’ 
cyclical behaviour, comparing it with the current dispersion in other monetary unions and 
analysing whether the synchrony has changed in recent years and the reasons behind the 
cycle proximity. To do this the first statistic to look at is probably the dispersion of growth 
rates across countries. Chart 3.1 presents the standard deviation for both the 12 euro area 
countries and the largest four, as well as similar statistics for other monetary unions. The chart 
shows that the degree of dispersion is now below that at the beginning of the 90s. 
Interestingly, the standard deviation of GDP growth rates of EMU countries does not lie 
significantly above that of US states, and is only moderately higher than the dispersion 
between German länder. Therefore, we can hardly take the dispersion of EMU countries, in 
terms of GDP growth, to be necessarily excessive for a workable Monetary Union.  
Moreover, dispersion of GDP growth rates could, to some extent, be due to different 
potential growth.2 Therefore, in order to assess cyclical divergences it is probably more 
precise to use instead output gaps. To do so, we first present some updated results from 
Cabrero, Chuliá and Millaruelo (2002), where a frequency band filter is used to estimate the 
cyclical component.3 Chart 3.2 presents the weighted and unweighted standard deviation of 
this cyclical component for the 12 euro area countries and the 4 largest ones. In this case, 
it is clear that the dispersion of output gaps is indeed much lower now than it was in the 
early nineties. The greatest progress in reducing divergence was made before the process 
of setting up the euro area began; it took place from 1993, after the impact of 
Germany’s reunification had been absorbed and the ERM crisis in late 1992 and the first 
few months of 1993 had been resolved. According to both measures, cyclical divergences 
have not changed much after 1999. This fact may be seen as a failure of EMU to increase 
cyclical synchrony between Member States. At the same time, it does suggest that the lack 
of domestic stabilisation tools has not had an adverse influence on the degree of 
macroeconomic disparities across countries. 
Looking more closely at business cycle fluctuations in each Member State –as in 
Chart 3.3– it is striking that the correlation between the domestic and the aggregate output 
gap is very high for almost all of them. Indeed, the contemporaneous correlations between 
the output gap of the euro area and that of each member country are typically around 90%. 
                                                                          
2. According to EC calculations, in the last years, trend growth dispersion explains up to 80% of total euro area growth 
dispersion [see European Comission (2005)]. 
3. To calculate the cyclical component, first the trend-cycle component is estimated using TRAMOSEATS applications. 
Subsequently, the cycle is extracted using the TRACE application. The main references followed are: Gómez and 
Maravall (1996), Kaiser and Maravall (1999), and Gómez (1999 and 2001). 
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The chart also shows that Finland4 is a special case which has a low correlation with the euro 
area and lags the other euro area countries. This may be because in the past it had strong 
trade ties with the USSR and was affected by the Soviet economic collapse at the end of 
the 1980s. Nowadays, Finland’s industrial structure also happens to be somewhat singular, 
given its specialisation in the high-technology sector. 
The above evidence seems to suggest that there could already be a common 
European cycle. This is in line with the findings of Artis et al. (1997) and Mansour (2003). 
More recently, Camacho, Pérez-Quirós and Sáiz (2004) fail to find evidence supporting that 
view. These authors develop several indicators of distance between business cycles of 
different economies. These distances are defined as 1 minus the correlation across countries 
of the cyclical component of the Industrial Production Index derived with three different 
statistical procedures. A number of bilateral distances were constructed and projected in a 
two-dimensional space as Chart 3.4 plots. The chart shows that, in general, there are some 
relevant discrepancies in bilateral distances between EMU countries themselves and with 
third countries. Based on that, they can reject the hypothesis of a single euro-economy 
attractor. 
However, as seen in Chart 3.4, bilateral distances corresponding to euro area 
countries tend to cluster in a specific region of the space, thereby suggesting that the cycles 
of EMU countries have in fact much more in common with one another than with other 
countries. Among the European countries, Greece and Portugal exhibit fewer similarities with 
other European cycles. In addition, the cycle in Finland seems closer to the cycles of Canada 
and United States than to those of the euro area countries. 
Moreover, of special interest is the evidence found on the variables explaining 
the estimated distances. The results are presented in Table 3.1 and are robust to different 
methodologies used to obtain the distances. Distances can be explained by a number of 
structural features such as the relative weight of the different sectors, labour productivity 
and fiscal policies. Interestingly, monetary and exchange rate policies are found to be 
non-significant, which suggests that domestic monetary policies do not help mitigate 
discrepancies nor contribute to increasing distances. More importantly, bilateral trade has a 
robust and significant negative impact on distances. 
Therefore, there are probably some non-negligible cyclical discrepancies across 
EMU countries that may make it difficult to be able to accept statistically the hypothesis of a 
single euro area business cycle. But the evidence shows that heterogeneity is not large by 
any reasonable standard and, in particular, it is in line with those of regions within other 
monetary unions. It is also interesting that discrepancies do not seem to be much influenced 
by monetary and exchange rate policies and that, by contrast, there is clear scope for further 
convergence of cyclical developments in the future if trade links strengthen as expected. 
                                                                          
4. The data on Ireland are insufficient and excluded in this exercise. The sample period for analysis of the quarterly items 
in the National Accounts runs from 1988 Q1 to 2004 Q4. 
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4 What causes cycle divergences? 
When dealing with possible sources of cyclical discrepancies we have to distinguish between 
those associated with the different exposure of Member States to different types of shocks 
and those derived from the mechanisms through which common or idiosyncratic shocks 
affect the relevant macroeconomic variables in each country. 
4.1 Exposure to shocks 
Following previous literature on economic integration and optimal currency areas 
[see e.g. Masson and Taylor (1993)] we consider exposure to four types of shocks: foreign 
demand from outside the euro area, oil imports, sector-specific developments and asset 
prices. 
Focusing first on relevant external shocks, the overall sensitivity of the area and its 
members to a trade shock depends on the relative importance of non-euro area trade 
in relation to domestic economic activity. Chart 4.1 shows the significance of external trade in 
the different countries, in terms of GDP. As the chart reveals, there is a significant dispersion 
of the weight in GDP of trade with third countries which implies a relatively high degree of 
cross-country heterogeneity in the degree of exposure to external trade shocks. Among 
the euro area countries, in Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Netherlands non-euro area trade 
accounts for a much larger share of GDP than in the rest of the euro area. By contrast, 
countries such as Portugal, Spain and France show a significantly lower exposure than the 
average. It is also worth pointing out that there seem to be discrepancies in relation to 
the structure of external trade with third countries, both in terms of its geographical 
distribution and its product composition [Cabrero, Chuliá and Millaruelo (2004)]. 
As regards exposure to oil prices, Chart 4.2 plots net oil imports as a percentage 
of GDP. This ratio is relatively similar across countries, with some small countries, such as 
Portugal and Greece, outperforming the average share of net oil imports in terms of GDP. 
In order to assess the exposure in different countries to sector-specific shocks, it is 
appropriate to look at the homogeneity and diversification of the productive structure. 
Charts 4.3 and 4.4 show first the composition of each Member State’s gross value added 
and second, the composition of industrial production according to the technology intensity 
of each industry. Chart 4.3 suggests that the exposure of EMU countries to sector-specific 
shocks is not very different. Services represent a very similar share of output –around 65-70% 
in most countries– and below that in the United States, where it stands above 75%. 
Manufacturing also represents a share close to 20% in most Member States, with a 
somewhat higher value in Finland. The share of agriculture holds constant at between 1% 
and 4%, and that of construction between 4% and 8%, in both cases above the related US 
shares. In terms of the technology intensity of industrial production5 there are some 
discrepancies, although most countries seem to attach a larger weight to medium-technology 
industries and the share of high-technology industries is smaller than in the United States in 
the majority of countries with the usual exception of Ireland and Finland (Chart 4.4). Therefore, 
as often mentioned, sectoral specialisation in the eurozone does not differ much and most 
countries seem to have a relatively diversified production structure which does not seem very 
heterogeneous across national economies. 
                                                                          
5. Gordo, Gil and Pérez (2003) analyse in depth the specialisation and geographical distribution of industrial activity in the 
EU-15 countries. 
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Finally, focusing on the potential macroeconomic relevance of asset price variations, 
Chart 4.5 plots the weight of marketable instruments in households’ and non-financial 
corporations’ balance sheets. It can be seen that all countries have a degree of intermediation 
of financial flows that is relatively high if compared with the United States, which shows a 
slow declining trend. Non-marketable financial assets represent more than 30% of total 
household financial assets in most countries, with the only clear exception being Netherlands, 
in which this share is in any event above that in the United States. As far as firms’ financing is 
concerned, bank loans account for somewhere between 30% and 40% of total liabilities 
in most countries, with Austria somewhat above and France below these figures. The ratio 
is in any case higher than in the United States. As regards real assets, Table 4.1 shows that 
the exposure to house prices is probably larger than that to financial asset prices in all 
countries and heterogeneity seems more pronounced. As can be seen here, although the 
ratio of residential investment to GDP lies not far from the EMU average (5.9%) in most 
countries, the ratio of owner-occupied dwellings does vary significantly across countries. We 
will see later whether this translates into different housing wealth effects across countries. 
Therefore, from the purely descriptive evidence presented here, there would 
not seem to be any large systematic discrepancies in exposures to financial asset prices, 
sector-specific developments and oil shocks. More relevant may be the heterogeneity of 
foreign demand shocks on different countries. 
4.2 Transmission mechanism 
The second source of cyclical discrepancies in Member States is the possible heterogeneity 
of the transmission mechanisms of different shocks, i.e. the differences in the path of 
adjustment to exogenous developments. Probably, the most important propagation channel 
is the Monetary Transmission Mechanism (MTM). But we will also review some specific 
evidence on the functioning of labour and product markets as this explains much of the 
adjustment path of the economy after any type of shock. 
Looking first at the transmission of monetary impulses, in an exercise recently 
performed by the Working Group on Econometric Modelling (ECB)6 it was found that the 
cross-country correlation of output and price responses to a common interest rate shock was 
relatively high in all euro area countries with the exception of Finland and Austria 
(see Chart 4.6). In this exercise it was found, however, that the relative importance of specific 
transmission channels such as the substitution effect, the cost of capital channel and the 
exchange-rate channel differ among the euro members7 (see Chart 4.7). The authors of 
these studies were also able to find some relationship between those discrepancies and 
certain structural and policy features. For example, labour market protection seemed to be 
positively correlated with the magnitude of the substitution channel and, naturally, openness 
with that of the exchange-rate channel.  
But, not surprisingly, financial structures are those that matter most when explaining 
the discrepancies in interest rate effects on output and inflation. The results of the Eurosystem 
Monetary Transmission Network collected in Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese (2002) 
show that the importance of quantitative financial channels –such as credit, lending and 
balance-sheet effects– may be high in some countries (such as Italy, France, Germany 
and Belgium) while seemingly irrelevant in others (such as Finland, Spain and Luxembourg). 
This, by definition, would make the effect of interest rates on economic activity differ 
according to the financial situation of firms and banks, in a way which may not be quite 
homogenous across countries. 
                                                                          
6. See Van Els, Locarno, Morgan and Villettelle (2001), and Berben, Locarno, Morgan and Vallés (2004). 
7. The differences in the spillover channel are less important and the cash flow/income and wealth channels are only 
estimated for a few countries. 
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Finally, with respect to wealth effects, we have recent evidence from the OECD 
depicted in Table 4.2 which shows that the Marginal Propensity to Consume out of wealth is 
significantly lower in the euro area than in the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia. The degree of heterogeneity within the euro zone is rather limited –even in the 
case of housing wealth– with the exception of Netherlands, where these effects seem very 
pronounced given the high exposure of agents in this country to financial asset prices and the 
widespread use of Mortgage Equity Withdrawal, whose importance is relatively minor in other 
Member Countries. 
Therefore, while there seem to be no large systematic differences in Monetary 
Transmission Mechanisms, there are some discrepancies, mostly affecting the relative 
importance of the various transmission channels as a consequence of domestic institutional 
idiosyncrasies and differences in financial structures and labour markets. 
Another category of country characteristics that could contribute to macroeconomic 
discrepancies in connection with common or idiosyncratic shocks is related to the functioning 
of product and labour markets. Chart 4.8 summarises the relative position of countries in 
terms of product market regulation according to a qualitative indicator constructed by 
the OECD.8 It can be seen that the degree of flexibility in the euro zone stands at around the 
OECD average in 2003, being clearly less flexible than Anglo-Saxon countries and more 
flexible than other non-EMU countries, with a moderate degree of heterogeneity within 
the euro zone. Probably more relevant, however, is the evidence on the degree of price 
flexibility. In a recent ambitious research initiative within the Eurosystem, a number of country 
studies were produced exploring price patterns using highly disaggregated data. As shown 
in Table 4.3, it was found that the frequency of price changes in the eurozone normally 
fluctuated within a range of 13-23% per month, clearly below the frequency prevailing in 
the United States, the sectorial pattern being quite similar in all countries. Services proved the 
most rigid sector while energy was constantly the most flexible one. In addition, the share of 
downward adjustments was around 40% of the total price changes in most countries. This 
finding suggests models and policy positions that rely on the existence of relevant downward 
price rigidities may be worth reviewing. 
The degree of heterogeneity of labour markets is, however, probably larger. 
Chart 4.9 plots a standard indicator of labour market functioning such as the cyclically 
adjusted employment rate calculated by Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005). Almost all EMU 
countries show figures below the OECD average, although the range is quite wide, extending 
from 55% in Italy to 75% in Netherlands. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the degree of wage 
rigidities also seems relatively large. The results of the “International Wage Flexibility Project”9 
show that countries vary widely in terms of their degree of nominal and real wage rigidity and 
no clear EMU patterns seem to emerge from the results (see chart 4.10). 
Therefore, the domestic adjustment mechanisms in euro zone countries seem to 
have a number of similarities such as the patterns of interest rate and wealth effects and 
the functioning of product markets; in particular, the degree of price rigidity. But there are also 
some discrepancies which are especially evident in the relative weight of different monetary 
transmission channels, due to financial structures and other idiosyncratic features. And the 
functioning of labour markets seems particularly heterogeneous. 
                                                                          
8. See Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005). 
9. See Dickens et al. (2005), presented at ECB Watchers Conference in Frankfurt, June 3, 2005. 
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5 Do these discrepancies matter for monetary policy? 
This is obviously a very difficult question the answer to which requires a research effort that 
has still to be completed. This section presents two simple exercises to obtain, at least, 
some preliminary intuitions on this issue. In an initial exercise we have used a full 
macro-econometric model –the NIGEM– to see whether, given a common shock, purely 
domestic-oriented monetary policies following similar rules would have helped reduce the 
dispersion of output and inflation. In other words, is the single monetary policy becoming 
destabilising after a common shock, thereby exacerbating discrepancies? For that purpose 
we consider three common shocks (a 10% increase in oil prices, a 5% increase in external 
demand and an increase in government consumption equal to 1% of GDP). For each shock 
we compute the effects on GDP and the consumption deflator for each country under 
domestic rules (every country has its own monetary regime) and single monetary policy rules 
(EMU exists and monetary policy responds to the area as a whole). Note that in NIGEM 
exchange rates are determined endogenously through interest-rate parity conditions. 
Table 5.1 presents the dispersion measure of the percentage deviation from baseline level 
after three years for the five largest EMU countries, under the two monetary policy regimes 
considered: EMU (single monetary rule) and NO EMU (domestic rules). 
We see that, under both regimes, the dispersion generated by the common shocks 
is always moderate although slightly larger in the case of oil shocks. The heterogeneity in the 
response to the oil shock seems basically due to the different functioning of the labour 
markets across countries –as oil dependence does not differ much in general. In any case, 
these results are roughly in line with recent findings by Giannone and Reichlin (2005), which 
attach little importance to common shocks as an explanatory factor of persistent growth 
differentials across EMU countries. 
Moreover, the simulations show that the absence of domestic monetary and foreign 
exchange tools does have an ambiguous effect on dispersion. Domestic rules do contribute 
to moderating the dispersion of GDP under an oil shock and an external demand shock. But 
under an aggregate demand shock the standard deviation of GDP is higher with domestic 
monetary policies than when the single monetary and exchange-rate policy is assumed. 
Interestingly, in all three cases the dispersion of inflation rates is lower under the single 
monetary policy than under the domestic monetary rules. The reason is of course the 
behaviour of the bilateral exchange rates which, over business cycle frequencies, may 
sometimes not contribute much to output or, especially, price stabilisation. Arguably, this is 
quite a mechanical exercise as it is always possible to design domestic policy rules that could 
do a better job in stabilising the economy than the simple Taylor rule assumed in the NIGEM 
simulation. But still, this exercise does help to illustrate –in line with other results in the 
academic literature– that it cannot be taken for granted that EMU reduces the scope for 
macroeconomic stability when countries face common shocks, even if member countries are 
not, as seen, absolutely heterogeneous. 
The results above do not, however, exclude the possibility of EMU countries facing 
difficulties to stabilise the economy in the presence of country-specific shocks. In a second 
exercise we again use NIGEM to compare the effects on GDP and prices of an increase of 
public consumption in a large country (Germany) and in a medium-sized one (Spain) under 
the two regimes considered: EMU (monetary policy responds to the area as a whole) and NO 
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EMU (every country has its own monetary regime), as in the first exercise. As we can see in 
Table 5.2, differences across regimes in interest rates and GDP after an idiosyncratic shock 
are moderate in Germany and relatively large in the case of Spain.10 The effects of EMU on 
inflation after domestic shocks are, however, relatively minor as exchange rate movements 
tend to compensate the demand effect on prices.11 In any case, results suggest that EMU 
may potentially harm output stability in countries facing idiosyncratic shocks. This effect would 
logically be larger the bigger the country. 
                                                                          
10. Due to the greater weight of Germany in the euro area, it might seem striking that a 1% of GDP increase in 
government consumption in Germany has the same effect on euro area GDP as the same increase in Spain. The reason 
behind it is mainly related to the way inflation expectations for each country are constructed in NIGEM. In Spain, 
inflation expectations are higher than in Germany because a constant is systematically added to it. This means that 
in Spain, after the positive demand shock, the user cost of capital is lower and real wages are higher than in Germany, 
boosting at the end of the third year investment and consumption, respectively, and, eventually, GDP. 
11. Results may be sensitive to the choice of the exchange rate rule in the NIGEM simulations. A forward rule would 
actually imply in Germany lower GDP discrepancies across regimes and higher inflation in EMU in the first years of the 
simulations. Convergence was, however, not achieved when a forward rule was applied to Spain. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
Using available statistical information, recent literature and some model simulations, this 
paper has documented five basic stylised facts related to cross-country economic 
discrepancies within EMU. First, EMU countries show some noticeable discrepancies in terms 
of economic development, exposure to shocks and adjustment mechanisms. Second, 
despite the different national economic structures, the degree of similarity of the cyclical 
pattern of countries’ output is quite high. Third, the monetary and exchange rate regime seem 
so far to have exerted only a limited influence on the remaining growth dispersion across 
countries. Fourth, the existing cyclical differences seem more influenced by idiosyncratic 
shocks than to the heterogeneity of the propagation mechanisms of common shocks. Fifth, 
although EMU makes only a relatively small difference in terms of the cross-country effects of 
common shocks, it may have an influence on the ability of countries to absorb idiosyncratic 
shocks. Therefore, what matters is not cross-country heterogeneity of economic structures as 
much as flexibility in national economies to minimise the destabilising effects of 
country-specific shocks. But, importantly, this poses a domestic policy challenge which 
would be there even under national monetary sovereignty. The single currency simply makes 
economic reform more urgent. 
By way of conclusion, the economic and political reasons that helped push 
forward the EMU project seem to remain valid. In particular, the euro is gaining space as an 
international currency, trade and financial integration is progressing, macroeconomic 
stability is today a reality throughout the Union, including countries that never really 
enjoyed such stability in the past; and, after a successful changeover, European citizens are 
already benefiting from the advantages of being able to use the same banknotes and coins 
in 12 different countries. If the benefits are already tangible, this paper has argued that the 
potential risks that were identified when the single-currency project was launched in the early 
nineties –mainly to the narrowing of the set of domestic stabilisation tools– have not become 
as severe as many feared at that time. 
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 Table 2.1
1991 1998 2004
EMU - US
PER CAPITA GDP (a) 72.8 70.8 69.1
PRODUCTIVITY 83.9 82.9 76.1
EMPLOYMENT / POP.(15 - 64) 84.9 83.9 90.6
POP.(15 - 64) / TOTAL POP. 102.1 101.8 100.2
SOURCE: Ameco.
(a) Based on constant prices series expressed in terms of 1995 purchasing power standard (PPS).
UNITED STATES = 100
RELATIVE LEVELS
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN LEVELS OF PER CAPITA GDP
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Chart 2.1
   Source: Ameco.
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   Source: Ameco.
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   SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
   (a)   Standard deviations.
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   SOURCE: Banco de España.
   (a)   National accounts 1995.
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   SOURCE: Banco de España.
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MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING MAP FROM AVERAGED 
BUSINESS CYCLE DISTANCES
Chart 3.4
   SOURCE: Camacho M., G. Pérez-Quiros and L. Sáiz (2004).
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 BUSINESS CYCLE DISTANCES AND MACROECONOMIC 
VARIABLES
Table 3.1
   SOURCE: Camacho M., G. Pérez-Quiros and L. Sáiz (2004).
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   SOURCES: Eurostat and US Census Bureau.
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   SOURCES: Eurostat and OECD.
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   SOURCES: SBSplus of Eurostat and Banco de España.
                                       BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0504 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
2003
%
σ = 8.1
σ weighted = 6.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
1998
%
σ = 10.6
σ weighted = 8.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
1995
%
σ = 10.4
σ weighted = 7.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
2003
% σ weighted = 6
σ = 8.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
1998
%
σ = 11
σ weighted = 7.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI USA
1995
% σ weighted = 8.3
σ = 14.7
HOUSEHOLDS. CURRENCY AND DEPOSITS AS % OF TOTAL FINANCIAL ASSETS
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS. LOANS AS % OF TOTAL FINANCIAL LIABILITIES
Chart 4.5
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Ratio of residential 
investment to GDP
 Share of owner 
occupied dwellings
2004 2002
Belgium 4.1 69.8
Germany 6.6 42.6
Greece 5.4 74.0
Spain 7.3 84.3
France 5.1 56.1
Ireland 7.3 77.4
Italy 5.8 72.8
Luxembourg 2.9 71.8
Netherlands 5.9 54.2
Austria 4.6 57.3
Portugal 6.2 75.7
Finland 5.1 58.0
Euro area 5.9 60.0
US 4.5 68.3
OVERVIEW OF EU HOUSING SECTOR (%) Table 4.1
   SOURCES: Eurostat ant US Census Bureau.
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COMMON MONETARY POLICY SIMULATION Chart 4.6
   SOURCE: Berben R.-P., A. Locarno, J. Morgan and J. Valles (2004).
OUTPUT AND PRICE RESPONSES: CORRELATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND THE EURO AREA
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MAGNITUDE OF THE SUBSTITUTION CHANNEL Chart 4.7
   SOURCE: Berben R.-P., A. Locarno, J. Morgan and J. Valles (2004).
MAGNITUDE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE CHANNEL
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Short-term Long-term
Housing Financial Housing Financial
Germany … 0.01 … 0.02
France … … … 0.02
Italy … 0.01 0.01 0.01
Spain 0.01 … 0.02 0.02
Netherlands 0.02 … 0.08 0.06
United States … 0.02 0.05 0.03
Japan 0.01 … 0.01 0.07
United Kingdom 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.04
Canada 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
Australia 0.02 … 0.07 0.03
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM IMPACT OF FINANCIAL AND 
HOUSING WEALTH ON CONSUMPTION
Table 4.2
   SOURCE: OECD.
ESTIMATED SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME OUT OF 
FINANCIAL AND HOUSING WEALTH
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CHANGES IN PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION, 1998 - 2003 Chart 4.8
   SOURCE: Brandt N., J.M. Burniaux and R. Duval (2005).
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Austria 37,5 15,5 72,3 8,4 7,1 15,4
Belgium 31,5 19,1 81,6 5,9 3,0 17,6
Germany 25,2 8,9 91,4 5,4 4,3 13,5
Spain 50,9 17,7 0,0 6,1 4,6 13,3
Finland 52,7 12,8 89,3 18,1 11,6 20,3
France 24,7 20,3 76,9 18,0 7,4 20,9
Italy 19,3 9,4 61,6 5,8 4,6 10,0
Luxembourg 54,6 10,5 73,9 14,5 4,8 23,0
The Netherlands 30,8 17,3 72,6 14,2 7,9 13,2
Portugal 55,3 24,5 15,9 14,3 13,6 21,1
Euro 28,3 13,7 78,0 9,2 5,6 15,1
Services Total
Unprocessed 
food
Processed 
food
Energy
Non-energy 
industrial 
goods
FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES (a) Table 4.3
   SOURCE: Dyne, E., L.J.Álvarez, et al. (2005).
   (a)   The numbers mean taht, on average, the x p.c. Of prices are changed on a given month.
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EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PATICIPATION IN OECD
COUNTRIES, 1994-2003 (a)
Chart 4.9
CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT RATE (b)
   SOURCE: Brandt N., J.M. Burniaux and R. Duval (2005).
   (a)   2002 for Iceland and Luxembourg.
   (b)   Estimated by controlling for the output gap and smoothed by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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REAL AND NOMINAL RIGIDITY BY COUNTRY Chart 4.10
   Source: Dickens, W. T. et al. (2005).
   (a)   Fraction affected means the fraction of workers potentially affected by downward nominal or real wage rigidity. These measures 
vary between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates perfect flexibility (no one is constrained) and 1 indicates full rigidity (all workers are potentially 
constrained).
FRACTION AFFECTED (a)
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GDP
Private consumption 
deflator
EMU NO EMU EMU NO EMU
Common shocks
Increase in oil prices
   Unweighted -0.90 -0.58 0.41 0.50
   Weighted -0.67 -0.44 0.52 0.61
Increase in external demand
   Unweighted 0.27 0.21 0.57 0.61
   Weighted 0.21 0.15 0.60 0.67
Increase in government consumption 
in all EMU countries
   Unweighted 0.33 0.37 0.46 0.57
   Weighted 0.39 0.43 0.53 0.65
EFFECTS ON DISPERSION FROM DIFFERENT SHOCKS
Table 5.1
Coefficients of variation  (a)
   SOURCE: Banco de España.
   (a)   Unweighted and weighted coefficients of variation of the percentage deviation 
from baseline level for the bigger five EMU countries after three years.
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GDP Consumption deflator Short term interest rates
EMU NO EMU EMU NO EMU EMU NO EMU
Shock
1% of GDP increase in government
consumption in Germany
  Effect on:
   Germany 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.19
   France -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.01
   Italy 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.03
   Spain 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.03
   Euro area (b) 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.08
1% of GDP increase in government
consumption in Spain
  Effect on:
   Germany 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01
   France 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01
   Italy 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02
   Spain 0.66 0.35 0.27 0.30 0.08 0.45
   Euro area (b) 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06
EFFECTS OF AN IDYOSINCRATIC DEMAND SHOCK (a)
Table 5.2
PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM BASELINE AFTER THREE YEARS
   SOURCE: Banco de España.
   (a)   A backward-looking exchange rate determination rule is used. For example, in the case of Germany, the rule is: 
log(gerx(t)) = log(gerx(t-1)) + 0,25* log ( (100+ger3m (t-1) )/ (100+usr3m(t-1)) ), where gerx is the exchange rate expressed 
in units of national currency for US dollar, ger3m is the three-month interest rate in Germany and usr3m is the tree-month 
interest rate in the US.
   (b)   GDP-weighted average of the previous four countries and Netherlands.
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